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There has evolved over the years in South Africa a
phenomenon that can loosely be called 'urban apartheid'. The
essential objectives of urban apartheid have been to regulate the
number of Africans living in urban areas, and to exercise tight
control over the daily lives of urban Africans. Underlying these
essential objectives have been further fundamental concerns: to
maintain the supply of labour at sufficient levels to meet the
needs of capital; to ensure that the demand for different types
of labour is met, whether it be migrant, unskilled or skilled;
to all£*y the paranoia and fears of an urban middle class who felt,
their health and safety . threatened by the large numerical
presence of the black underclasses.
The history of urban apartheid in twentieth century South
Africa has been marked by the'efforts of the state, central and
local, to achieve these often contradictory objectives, aiid by
the struggles of the black underclasses tc« resist the imposition
of controls. Over the years two mechanisms have been devised by
the state as the chief components of the urban apartheid s/stem:
influx control and segregation. Much has been written about both
of these instruments of control. For instance, work has been
done on the evolving legislative framework of urban apartheid.1
Hindson has produced an important analysis of the influx control
system, showing how its major functions changed over time.a In
recent years studies in local urban history have proliferated,
and some of these have been concerned with the issues of influx
control and segregation.3 There has, though, been virtually no
attempt to trace and analyse the development of influx control
and segregation over time in any specific local urban context.
Part of the purpose of this essay is to attempt such an
examination, looking at how these mechanisms evolved in Durban
through the twentieth century up until the beginnings of the
'group areas era' in the early 1950s.
It will clearly be insufficient to provide a mere
catalogue of control measures. The local, regional and national
context in which influx control and segregation were implemented
will have to be examined. Influx control and segregation
measures in Durban can only be understood in terms of demographic
trends and the changing political economy of the city. Attention
must be paid to the many forces that shaped local state policy:
the demands of capital; the dictates of the central government;
pressure exerted by local ratepayers; the perceptions and
policies of key local administrators; the struggles of Durban's
black underclasses.
At various times segregation measures in Durban have
affected Africans, Indians and 'Coloureds'. I he main focus of
this essay is the. way in which certain forms.of urban apartheid
operated against Africans in Durban. The time-span covered can
be broken down into three main phases: the first runs to about
1920; the second from .1920 until 1936-37: and the third from
1936-'-37 until the early 1950s.
,'t .
Before the early 1920s influx control and segregation
were imposed only to a very limited extent in Durban. This was
because the economic, social and demographic make-up of the town
did not- seem to demand such controls at the time. The town's
economy still rested very largely on commerce and shipping. Its
industrial base was minuscule, in spite of some expansion during
the South African War and World War One. Moreover, Durban was
still in an early stage of urban growth at the beginning of the
century. In 1900 its total population amounted to about 55,700,
and by 1921 it was still only 90,500. Africans made up less than
one-third of the total population; in 1921 there were an
estimated 28,400 Africans living in Durban.*
The vast majority of this African population was male.
In 1921 ,the African male/female ratio was 6,6:1." Many of these
males were migrant workers living in so—called "barracks"
(single-quarter hostels) or in private commercial compounds.
This preponderance of male migrants reflected the central
position of the docks in the local economy. The docks required a
flexible labour supply to cope with fluctuations in shipping and
the seasonal demand for labour. Thus the docks came to rely on
casual, 'togt' labour, supplied largely by unskilled African
migrants.
In 1911 a member of the Natal Manufacturers Association
stated, quite bluntly, his vision of an ideal labour supply:
"...the essential requirements are: - l.*That the labour should
be cheap. 2. That it should be constant. 3. That it should be
controllable."*" Casual, 'toqt' labour did not really satisfy
these requirements. As Hemson has shown, 'togt' workers at the
Durban docks enjoyed a certain degree of independence and could
command relatively high wages. The point was not lost on either
local employers or the police. Durban's Superintendent of
Police,, R.C. Alexander, proposed his solution in giving evidence
to the South African Native Affairs Commission in 1904: "I would
put my Natives in barracks and let them march into the town as
they do with, soldiers. That has been my ambition for- 25 years,
and I have not altered it.'""
Alexander's lament about the lack of regimentation and
segregation arose out of what he saw as the laxity of the
corporation in failing to provide controlled accommodation for
casual workers. Since 1878, when the first "barracks" had been
built, he had pestered the corporation to build more: "Then it
took me from 1878 to 1894 worrying the Corporation every year to
build some.barracks. Then they built the old barracks down at
the Point....Then it took me from 1894 to 1904 to get them to put
up these other barracks. At the same rate of progress, thn next
barracks will not be put up during my life.""^
A Native Locations Act, passed by the Natal legislature
in 1904, opened up the possibility of urban segregation. The Act
enabled Durban and Pietermaritzburg to establish segregated urban
locations for Africans. But it was no more than enabling
legislation, and the Durban municipality did not art on it. The
town counti 1 was neither* willing to provide the necessary,
finance, nor able to agree on a site for such a location.10. In
the early 1900s there continued to be much debate and discussion
among local capitalists and officials about the? pros and cons of
herding Africans into a segregated location.xx But the
municipality stuck with the practice of providing limited
"barrack" accommodation Tor single workers. In 19.1-1 about 5,830
Africans, including 1,000 women, were housed in municipal
"barracks" or hostels.13 The first municipal housing for African
families did not become available till 1916 when Baumannvi1le was
opened; and this comprised a mere 120 so-called "cottages".
Just as the imperative to establish segregated locations
in Durban was not all that strong before the 1920s, so was the
machinery available to limit' African mobility and urban migration
not all that awesome. The political economy of both Durban
itself and the rural hinterland simply did not demand rigid
controls. The rural economy was still sufficiently resilient
that urban migration had not yet become the vital necessity that
it was to become for millions of Africans in later* generations.
However, controls restricting the physical and occupational
mobility of Africans in Durban existed from the nineteenth
century. In 1869 a 9 p.m. - 4 a.m. curfew was introduced.13 A
law passed by the Natal legislature in 1888 provided for the
registration of all African workers. From 1891 it was enforced
in Durban, not all that effectively, with a view to excluding
from the town "native deserters, idlers and vagabonds."i" This
represented an early attempt on the. part of the local state to
limit the African presence in Durban to labour needs. This was
to be the essence of the future influx control system.
A further step towards such a system was taken with the
enactment of another* Natal measure in 1901. This required all
African workers in the colony to obtain an identifiration pass,
which had to be carried at all times and produced on demand.10
By 1904 Police Superintendent Alexander was making full use of
this control mechanism: "...I have a Pass Book with a
counterfoil, and every Native who comes into the town to transact
business, such as purchasing goods, visiting friends, or looking
for work, goes straight to the Police Station. He cannot go an
inch without that pass." What is more, Alexander saw the
identification pass, not as a restrictive control, but as a
ticket to liberty: "I think the identification p*ss one of the
grandest things they could have. They can show their pass, and
say: 'I am so and so; there is my pass, I am a free man'."1*
Curious notions of freedom reigned among officialdom in early
twentieth century Durban.
"[he system of registration and identification passes was
consolidated and tightened in by-Jaws passed by the Durban town
council in 1.916. J.S. Me>rwii:k, the manager of Durban's newly
established •••unicip'*.! Native Affairs Oepar tmen I: (later changed to
Native Administration Di?par hnent.) , was soon expressing his
delight at the imnu'dia I.e.- impael: or the by-laws. Desertion and
crime were be?ing curbed. The by-laws, together with the new
local state apparatus for "native administration", offered the
prospect of much tighter control being exercised over Durban's
African population.1'' This was the foundation of the "Durban
system". Largely on the basis of profits derived from the
municipal beer monopoly, the Durban corporation was creating
administrative machinery that would serve as a model when
national policy-makers and legislators embarked in the early
1920s on formulating urban areas legislation for the country as a
whole.
Thus towards the end of the first phase, the period up to
about 1.420, the Durban local state was developing apparatus for
controlling the black underclasses. But the degree of control
being exercised at this stage was only very limited. Durban was
still in an early phase of industrialisation. It did not contain
a vast black proletariat. Indeed, early control measures were
rather directed at semi-proletarianised migrants. Moreover, these
measures were adopted largely at the Durban corporation's own
volition, with no prompting or pressure from the central state.
During our second phase, from about 1920 to the mid-
19303, there was both an intensification of pre-1920 trends and
some new developments. Durban's vast rural hinterland, where a
fairly buoyant farming economy had been sustaining African
reserve-dwellers as well as tenants on white-owned land,
gradually became more impoverished during the 1920s. The
reserves came to wilt under the pressures of overpopulation,
overstocking and drought, giving rise to outmigration. And
African tenants came to be squeezed off their plots as white
farmers, keen to put more of their land to direct productive use,
terminated quasi-feudal or leasing arrangements with their
tenants. The natural drift of impoverished reserve—dwellers or
evicted tenants was towards the urban areas. And an emerging
city like Durban was an obvious destination. In the 1920s Durban
was still a place where there were open spaces to be occupied and
opportunities to be exploited. Africans could rent backyard
rooms or outhouses in central areas, or they could occupy the
vacant sites of land not far from the city centre. There they
could participate in the lucrative "illicit" liquor traffic or
some other informal sector activity. Or they could find work in
the growing formal sector. During this second phase Durban
enjoyed sporadic industrial growth. After a recession in the
early 1920s, Durban's industry recovered in the mid-1920s. And
following on the great depression of the early 1930s, industry in
the city was entering a major period of growth by the mid- 1930s.
In these circumstances it was not surprising that the
African population of Durban should have been•growing in numbers.
In 1921 about 46,000 Africans lived in Durban; by 1936 the
figure had risen to about 71,000,*° The qi.iesi.iun at. once ari5HS,
how did the central state and the Durban local state respond to
this growing African urban presence? The form thai: thir> response
should take was, in fact,a matter of debate. One sirJe in t.lit?
debate favoured official recognition of the growing stabilisation
and permanence of the African labour-force in urban areas. This
position was expressed in the 1932 report of the Native Economic
Commission, and in the 1935 report of a Department of Native
Affairs sub-committee (the Young-Barrett Committee). The latter
argued that the issue of African urbanisation could not be?
resolved "...by expelling them [Africans from urban areas] as
soon as they have served the white man's purpose; ...thore is a
duty on Enlightened Authority... to concern itself with the
betterment of Native social conditions."''' The Young-Barrett
committee was responding specifically to the earlier report of
the Transvaal Local Government Commission (the Stallard
Commission). The Stallard Report, issued in 1922, reflected the
other side of the debate in its. oft-quoted conclusion that
Africans should only enter urban areas to minister to the while
man's needs.2'3
Which side prevailed in this debate? There is no clear-
cut answer to this question. It is probably true to say that
official thinking at the central state levE?l was veering more
towards the Young-Barrett view in the 1930s. However, this point
needs to be qualified in two ways. First, it would be wrong to
suggest that the stabilisation of African workers and the
Stallardist view, preferring the continuation of migrant labour,
were stark alternatives. As Hindson has shown, state policy
increasingly became geared towards sustaining a system of
differentiated labour-power, balancing " the requirements of
different capitalist sectors for either stabilised or migrant
labour.21
The second qualification is that the debate might have a
different outcome in different urban centres. This was possible
because in the 1920s and early 1930s the local state still
enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy from the central state.
It is true that the central state was beginning to intervene more
in the sphere of urban African management from the 1920s. This
intervention was embodied most apparently in the 1923 Natives
(Urban Areas) Act. However this measure had a very limited
impact on Durban. Some of the provisions of the 1923 Act, such
as the introduction of the municipal beer' monopoly and the native
revenue account, had already long since been in operation in
Durban. At the same time the Act was largely enabling
legislation, which imposed few obligcitions on municipalities.
Some of these non—obligatory clauses the Durban municipality
chose to ignore, at. least until the late 1920s. For instance,
the Act provided for the possible establishment of 'native
advisory boards'. Durban did not create one of these until 1929.
The Act also provided for the construction of segregated African
townships. It was only eleven years aftor the passing of the Act
that Lamont township, to the south of the city, was opened for
. occupation.
In Durban loral. ~:t.att? policy in the 1920s tendF?d towards
tlio Stal lardisl. position. Ihi.r. was partly madf? possible by the
city's geographical location. Durban's proximity to the reserves
facilitated labour migrancy, which was the basis of Stallardism.
Moreover the limited development of Durban's manufacturing sector
meant that the demand for semi-skilled stabilised labour was not
all that great. So structural factors made Stallardism possible.
But it was also very much encouraged and sustained by a key
figure in the local 'administrative apparatus. C.F. Layman was
the manager of Durban's Native Administration Department from
1921 until 1936. During his time at the helm he developed a
reputation for being authoritarian and unapproachable. In 1931
Durban's Native Advisory Board, a body that was not usually
accustomed to expressing forceful apposition, passed a vote of no
confidence in Layman.32 More significant was Layman's persistent
support for the Stallardist line. In 1923 he expressed his views
to the parliamentary select committee examining the Natives
(Urban Areas) Bill. Layman was critical of some aspects of the
original bill. For instance, he expressed his strong disapproval
of the bill's provision for African freehold tenure in urban
areas: "The natives will cease to recognise that they are in the
urban area primarily for employment, and once they become owners
in freehold the stimulus to good behaviour which is maintained by
the possibility of their leasehold tenure being forfeited will
cease to operate." Layman's voice may have carried some weight,
as the provision for freehold was taken out of the final bill.
Layman also fiercely objected to the growing tendency of African
families tu settle in urban areas like Durban: if "encouraged"
this tendency "will lead to a state of affairs in which the
control at present exercised over the native population in the
town will disappear."23 Far better, he contended, that "those
natives who wish to maintain touch with their homes in the
country should receive every possible facility and encouragement
to do so."2*
The Stallardist line was consistently expostulated by the
likes of Layman. But a rigid Stallardist policy was never
practicable. It could not be fully enforced, as Africans ignored
or evaded the controls restricting their movement. By the mid—
1930s a "differentiated" labour -force was becoming more and more
of a.reality in Durban. A rapidly declining male : female ratio
was clear evidence of family settlement and the growing
permanence of a large section of Durban's African population.
However, this did not prevent the Durban corporation from using
controls to contain the process of stabilisation.
The consistent, fundamental objective of these controls
was to restrict the African presence1 in Durban according to
labour needs. As we have seen, such controls had been in
operation in Durban since the nineteenth century. In the 1920s
there were efforts to systematise the controls even further. One
of the concerns of the* 1923 Urban Areas Act was to consolidate
regulations restricting African movement into urban areas. But
these consolidated regulations would only coma into force in
particular" urban areas aft(?r such areas had lieun proclaimed by
the Governor'—General . Durban became a proclaimed ares in .1.928,
thereby bringing into operation the controls laid down in the
1923 Act. As a result of the proclamation African work-seekers
and other visitors coming to Durban had to report . to a
registering officer within twenty—four hours of arrival. Work-
seekers could remain in a proclaimed area for a maximum of six
days. All those who did find work had to be registered; and
they were bound by service contracts which gave employers
considerable control over their workers. The service contract
was, in effect, a form of pass that had to be carried at all
times and be produced on.demand.as It obviously suited Layman.
In 1930 he was calling for "a systematic inspection of all Native
Registration passes" in Durban. He gained the backing of the
city council. And his hand was further strengthened by a 1930
amendment to the Urban Areas Act, providing for the deportation
from towns of Africans considered to be "idle, dissolute pr
disorderly". Armed with these weapons, Layman's department was
able to organise the expulsion from Durban of over 1,000 Africans
in 1930 alone.3*
The tightening of influx control measures in Durban was a
response to the growing African influx into the city, brought on
by a deterioration in the material position of rural Africans and
by the expansion of Durban's industrial sector. The essential
objective of influx control was to limit the si,:e of the African
influx without endangering the labour supply. It way thus geared
to meet capital's need for labour, and to satisfy police and
ratepayers' demands for social control by keeping out of Durban
those Africans who were surplus to labour requirements.
Social control, however, could not be achieved just by
limiting urban immigration. Control still had to lie exercised
over those Africans whose labour was required in the city. One
of the key mechanisms developed to achieve such control was
racial residential segregation. In the early 1930s the Durban
corporation came under considerable local pressure to implement
segregation. The pressure did not come from capital. Indeed,
strict residential segregation was often not in the best
interests of employers who liked to have their worker's living
close to the work-place. Rather did the pressure emanate from
the local police and middle-class ratepayers. In the forefront
of the demands for segregation was Chief Constable Whitsitt. He
complained that Africans of the "won't work, illicit liquor
selling class" were being "harboured" all over the borough.18"'
Whitsitt was supported by strong representations from various
ratepayers' associations. In 1933 and 1934 the Bluff, Mayvillp
and Umbilo associations, among others, demanded that their are'-js
be segregated, complaining particularly about the presence of
African 1iquor—dealers in their areas.5™
The upshot wat. .r.< series of segregation proclamations,
applied successively to specific areas of the city, culminating
in the proclamation of the whoAc? borough in 193V. The intent of
the measures was to prohibit any householder's in the proclaimed
areas from accommodating on their premises any Africans except:,
domestic workers or those exempted under the 1923 Act. As
Whitsitt put it, "The whole idea of having an area proclaimed is
to (jet rid of the Native inhabitants with the exception of
domestic servants." The effect of the proclamations was to force
many Africans out of the central residential areas of Durban to
the emerging shack settlements in Cato Manor and the southern
periphery of the city.2**
This was perhaps the first official manifestation of the
group areas approach, for which the Durban local state was to be
such an enthusiastic proponent in the following decades. This
early segregation drive did not, though, develop into a concerted
programme of segregation. It was essentially a foretaste of what
was to follow in the 1950s. In the 1930s wholesale segregation
was prevented by a legal loophole. The 1923 Act laid down that
in order to evict an urban resident, a municipality must first be
able to provide alternative accommodation for the evicted person.
This condition placed the onus on the Durban corporation to
provide more housing for Africans. It was in this context that
Lament- township was constructed, to the south of Durban, and
opened for occupation in 1934. But the building of Laniont was a
mere drop in the ocean. The corporation was unwilling to provide
the finance to embark on a substantial programme of African
housing. Moreover it was not yet entirely committed to the
principle of constructing African townships, which in themselves
amounted to an implicit recognition of labour stabilisation.
Rather was Durban's housing policy coming to be based on a dual
system: township accommodation for "stabilised" families, and
single quarters for migrant workers. This was a housing policy
that reflected the growing shift towards a system of
"differentiated labour-power" in Durban.
During this phase from about 1920 until the mid-1950s the
issues of influx control and segregation came more and more on to
the agendas of both the central government and the Durban
corporation. And measures were adopted that were to form the
basis of urban apartheid. In our third phase, from the mid-1930s
until the early 1950s, the political economy of Durban and its
hinterland changed significantly. This change was to lead
ultimately to a more intensive implementation of influx control
and segregation. The end of this phase was also to see a change
of government in South Africa. Many have ascribed the
intensification of urban apartheid in the i'VSOs to the newly
elected Nationalist government. This assumption needs to be
seriously questioned. As we shall see, the Durban corporation,
which was not controlled by a Nationalist, city council, was to'
show itself to be an enthusiastic proponent of urban apartheid.
From the mid -1930s those trends that had begun to ihrfiicjr?
the face of Durban during the previous twenty years or so
gathered momentum. The city's manufacturing sector, which had
etijoyed occasional phases of growth before the mid-lV30s, nuw
began to develop significantly. World War Two provided a m-ijor
stimulus. The metal and engineering industries assumed special
importance during wartime. And demand for locally produced
clothing rose as the war drastically curtailed imports. While
the manufacturing sector was growing, Durban's rural hinterland
was, for various reasons, providing a less and less stable
material existence? for African communities. The reserve
economies continued to deteriorate under the worsening burdens iif
overpopulation, overstocking and soil exhaustion. The 1936 Land
Act rendered ever more precarious the position of labour tenants
on white farms.
Rural immiseration had the effect of driving more and
more Africans away from the countryside. Industrial expansion,
and the accompanying growth in labour" demand, made Durban a
natural destination for rural emigrants. The estimated size of
Durban's African population rose from 63,457 in 1936 to about
150,000 in 1949.3O Moreover, the composition of this population
increase gave an irreversible demographic impetus to
stabilisation in the form of a changing male/female ratio.
Between 1936 and 1946 Durban's African female? population doubled
from about 14,200 to about 28,500. Over the same period the
ratio of African males to African females declined from 3,46:1 to
2,65:1.3J
These e,re clear indicators of a trend towards
stabilisation. But the proportion of African migrants to
permanent city—dwellers still remained very high in Durban in the
mid—1940s. According to an official government estimate for the
year 1946, about 74"/. of Durban's African population were
migrants. However, an unofficial estimate for 1953 reckoned that
about 5014 were migrants.32 It is , unlikely that such a
significant shift in the balance had occurred over a inert; seven
years. Rather is the disparity between the figures a reflection
of the difficulties involved in achieving accurate estimates and
in making a rigid distinction between migrants and non-migrant*.;.
Many Africans seem to have been weekly commuters between Durban
and the reserves; to classify them would have1 been problematic.
Whatever the exact proportion of migrants to non-
migrants, trie "differentiation of labour-power" was becoming a
demographic reality in Durban in the 194 0s. And it was « reality
that neither the central state nor the Durban local slate could
try to wish away. Centra) state thinking was reflected in the
reports of the Smit Committee and the Hagan Commission in the
- 1940s, both of which acknowledged the inevitability of African
urbanisation and the irreversibi1ity of labour stabilisation.
The Minister of Native Affairs, van der Byl, stated the position
clearly in a meeting with the Durban city council in November
1945:.
I ht? influx of families is the result. of
industrial development. II is a penalty
of all round prosperity. Industry
requires a permanent labour force
s L>*b.i \ i v.'HMi li.d'(::>ur ~ which gives gi eater
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efficiency. It will pay higher wages for a
man who will stay on the job all the year
round with an annual two or three week
holiday. Therefore the Native no longer
goes home every six or nine months. But
he is not prepared to sacrifice his family
life so he brings his family to town and
houses them where he can.33
This also seems to have been the dominant line of thinking in the
Durban corporation in the 1940s. It was partly a case of coming
to terms with realities. But Durban's departure from the older
approach may have been made easier by the retirement of the
ardent Stallardist, Layman, in 1936 and his replacement by
T.J. Chester as Manager of the municipal Native Administration
Department. Chester seems to have been more of a benevolent
paternalist. Even Champion had some good words to say about him:
"The Administration of the present Manager's predecessor [Layman]
was just the opposite of what we gladly enjoy today [under
Chester]."3'* No doubt Chester's rejection of a rigid Stallardist
line partly explains his relative popularity.
It would, however, be wrong to assume that the Durban
corporation's abandonment of Stallardism implied also a
relaxation of the controls exercised over the city's African
population. Both the central state and the Durban corporation
retained a fundamental concern to limit the African urban influx
to labour needs. Towards this end the influx control system was
tightened, intermittently rather than progressively, from the
late 1930s. A key measure was the 1937 Native Laws Amendment
Act. This legislation strengthened the influx control and
expulsion powers of local authorities. No African could enter an
urban area without the necessary permission. Illegal entrants
could be removed. Local authorities could refuse entry to any
African if there was a surplus of labour in the urban areat
concerned. And in order to determine whether such a surplus
existed or not, each local authority would be required to conduct
a biennial census, supplying details of African population and
employment levels.3"
The central government in the late 1930s was alarmed at
the growing African urban influx and was determined to curb it.3<!>
Thus the 1937 Ac:t was followed by an intensified implementation
of pass controls and a rapid increase in prosecutions for pass
offences. Influx control was tightened even further by a
proclamation issued in 1940. This restricted the right of
Africans to enter urban areas under the control of certain local
authorities only to those seeking or taking up employment or on a
bona fide temporary visit."
By 1940 it appeared as though a trend was developing
towards a more rigorous and repressive influx control system,
i., prefiguring the pattern of the 1950s and 1960s. However, during
the-1940s the pattern was interrupted, particularly in Durban.
There were two main, interconnected reasons for this. First, .m
11
ever more stringent implementation of influx control was not
always in the interests of a city like Durban. The Durban
economy tended to be subject to fluctuations in labour' demand.
These could be short-term and seasonal, depending on shipping
levels and the holiday trade, or of a longer terra nature,
depending on wider business conditions. Such fluctuations
required a more flexible implementation of influx control. This
can be illustrated for the late 1930s. As we have just st?t»n, the
central government was tightening influx control at this time.
But in 1938 Durban was enjoying a low unemployment level. Its
1938 census revealed that only 2'/. of African males in the city
were unemployed. Chester was concerned that influx control might
endanger the city's labour supply: "The present labour'
requirements of the City indicate that the present influx of
Natives to take the place of those returning to their homes
should not be restricted, as the percentage of unemployed is
infinitesimal."33 The fallowing year Chester was urging that
native commissioners throughout Natal be asked not to discourage
Africans from coming to Durban to obtain work."
The second factor inhibiting the implementation of influx
control was the outbreak of World War Two. Durban was a key
contributor to the country's war effort. During the war the
city's economy boomed. At the same time, the drain of personnel
to the war front placed a severe strain on the state apparatus.
It was largely in order to relieve pressure on the police that
the government decided in 1942 to relax the pasvj laws in the
major urban areas. Passes could now only be demanded from BI\
African suspected of criminal activity.
The combined effect of Durban's war--time boom and the
relaxation of the pass laws was to bring Africans flocking into
the city. In time the influx began to exceed the demand for
labour. And from 1944 key figures and bodies in the local state
began to call for the full reimplementation of the pass laws.
Early in 1944 a conference was held on the Alleged Increase of
Native Crime in Durban'. The participants at the conference
the chief magistrate, district commandant, the local native
commissioner, the town clerk, and city council representatives
called for the reimposition of the pass laws to check crime.*0
Chester complained that since the relaxation oT pass controls
"Durban had become the refuge for a considerable number of
workshy and dissolute natives and under the existing conditions
it was not possible to deal expeditiously with these
undesirables. '"*1
The Durban corporation was caught in a contradiction. It
needed the labour to service the city's growing economy. But
local officials were unhappy with the urban influx, which seemed
in their view to exacerbate the social problems that they
associated with the African presence. As Chester put it, "We
wanted their labour, and either wi-; had to sabotage our war' nffurt
by turning them out of town, i>r tolerate them where they were at
Cato Manor'. Wt> took the JfH;<Her of the two evils. ""'•*• In order to
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manage the contradiction as best as possible the local state?
continued to direct. its efforts towards regulating urban
migration in accordance? with labour demand. E<ut this exercise?
remained problematic as labour demand continued to fluctuate and
the calculation of demand tended to be uncertain and inexact.
hese variables militated against a consistent implementation of
influx control and made for the kind of vacillation and hesitancy
that characterised the Durban corporation's policy in the 1940s.
The municipal records reveal the corporation's concern that the
administration of influx control be as flexible as possible arid
allow for fluctuations over- time and changing local needs.
Such flexibility may have been possible for most of the
1940s because the central state had not yet firmly imposed its
stamp on urban policy. This, though, began to change after the
accession to power of the National Party in 1948. The
Nationalist government showed itself to be less prepared to make
concessions to meet particular local needs, and more concerned to
achieve a greater centralisation and uniformity in urban policy.
One of the new government's immediate concerns was to remove
"surplus" labour from urban areas. Thus the Durban corporation
received a telegram from the Department of Native Affairs in May
1949 stating that the Minister was "perturbed at high percentage
of unemployed [Africans in Durban]. Steps should be taken to
remove unemployed fi^ om urban area."*3 The government also
applied itself eagerly to the task of standardising and
tightening the mechanisms that controlled and restricted the
movement of Africans. Amended registration regulations, aimed at
African work-seekers or temporary visitors to urban areas, were
promulgated in 1949.*'' The Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-
ordination of Documents) Act was passed in 1952, consolidating
existing pass laws and introducing a standard pass book for
Africans. In the same year a new Native Laws Amendment Act
further strengthened the influx control apparatus. The aim and
effect of this measure was to reinforce the growing
differentiation between the stabilised African proletariat and
temporary migrants. The right to permanent urban residence
depended on strict qualifications being met. The access of
temporary migrants to urban areas was to be restricted according
to labour requirements.*1*
It is beyond the scope of this essay to probe in any
detail the growing centralisation of state urban policy under the
Nationalists in the 1950s and the impact of this process on
Durban. It can be said that this growing centralisation may have
introduced a new uniformity and rigidity into influx control;
and it would have limited the possibilities for the- flexible
implementation that the Durban corporat.idn had desired in
previous years. However, the? approach of the Nationalist
government did not represent any radical new departures from
earlier urban policies. The underlying features of state policy
continued to rest on the basic objectives of I ho pru- 1940 era-.
to limit the African urban presence according to labour-
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requirements, by excluding or removing people surplus to those
requirements; arid to secure a differentiation in status among
those whose Labour was required - a differentiation between
'stabilised' proletarians and temporary migrants. Moreover, this
basic: approach of the Nationalist government was not out of line
with the Durban corporation's thinking on influx control.
Although there had, over the years, been some shifts in this
thinking, it had consistently been rooted in those same basic
concerns which shaped government policy in the 1950s and beyond.
A similar picture of compatibility and congruity between
the policies of the Durban corporation and the central government
becomes apparent when we examine our second main theme, urban
segregation, for this period from the mid -1930s to the early
1950s. We have already seen how a segregationist drive against
Africans was launched in Durban in the early 1930s. In the 1740s
a similar drive was directed against Indians. Many whites had
been agitating against the growing "penetration" of Indians into
predominantly white -owned residential and trading areas. In
1943, under pressure from the Durban city council, the government
appointed Justice Kroome as a one-man commission to investigate
the extent of Indian "penetration" in Durban. His report, which
indicated that "penetration" was on the increase, was; followed by
restrictive legislation. The Trading and Occupation of Land
(Transvaal and Natal) Restriction Act, commonly known as the
"Pegging Act", was passed in 1943. It was a temporary measure
designed to restrict property transfers between whites and
Indians in Durban for three years. ' This was followed in 1946 by
the Asiatic Land (enure and Indian Representation Act, or "Ghetto
Act", a wider, more permanent measure that applied to the whole
of Natal. Among its provisions was one creating controlled and
uncontrolled areas. In the uncontrolled areas there were to be
no racial restrictions on property transfers; but in the
controlled areas intei—racial property transfers would be
prohibited, except by ministerial permit.*""
This assault on Indian property owners was part of a
larger segregationist blueprint that was being formulated in
Durban in the 1940s. In 1943 the city council's Post-War
Development Committee, believing that it was in the interests of
each racial group to be housed in aoparate areas, recommended
that a system of racial rolling be introduced in Durban. The
city's Valuator and Estates Manager had submitted a broad plan,
according to which certain areas of Durban would be set aside for
particular race groups. This formed the basis of the committee's
recommendation. The segregationist map of Durban envisaged by
the Valuator and Estates Manager was based on the projected
growth of the city's industrial areas to the west and south of
the harbour'. Segregated residential zones would therefore have
to be established "for the (our races to serve the Old Borough
Area and also, for' the four races to serve the industrial area".
A remarkabli? featt.it e of liii~. plan was the extent to which it
prefigured LIie pattern of segregation thai: came to be formally
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implemented under the Group Areas Act from the 1950s.'"'
While key figures in the Durban local state were thinking
more and more along these segregationist lines in the 1940s, the
corporation was not carrying the blueprint through.
Implementation of the blueprint would have involved a
considerable financial commitment from Durban, particularly for
the provision of African township housing. The corporation was
not prepared' to make this commitment. It is true that there was
some expansion in the provision of formal accommodation for
Africans from the late 1930s, best illustrated by the opening of
Chesteryilie in the mid-1940s. But this limited expansion was
never sufficient to keep pace with the rapid growth of the city's
African population. Thus by the late 1940s vast shack
settlements had grown in and around Durban - a trend hardly in
keeping with the segregationist blueprint which could not permit
such uncontrolled residential expansion.
Moreover, i n the 1940s the Durban corporation was under
no pressure from the central government to implement wholesale
segregation. Indeed, the Durban corporation seems to have been
ahead of the central government in its thinking on this issue in
the 1940s. Rather was the Department of Native Affairs in
Pretoria at this time preoccupied in trying to devise ways of
reducing the cost of African housing. Department officials were
stressing the need for mass housing for Africans to meet the
backlog; this would inevitably involve the construction of
individual housing units of poorer quality. Cut out the
'frills', use cheaper building materials, and employ African
labour on construction schemes - these were some of the cost-
saving proposals. The idea of Africans building their own homes
in controlled village settlement schemes was also given
favourable consideration.aa
' The .accession to power of the Nationalist government in
1948 was followed by a more vigorous and forceful pursuit of an
urban segregation policy, as embodied in the 1950 Group Areas
Act. It has sometimes been suggested that the group areas policy
was inflexibly imposed by a monolithic central government on some
non-Nationalist municipal authorities (such as Durban) that did
not accept the group areas principle. This was certainly not the
case with Durban. It is true that the Durban corporation might
not have implemented a wholesale segregation scheme without the
push from the Nationalist government and the element of
compulsion inherent in the Broup Areas Act. Nevertheless it
remains equally true that the Durban corporation was an
enthusiastic supporter of the group areas principle, from the
inception of the legislation. The Group Areas Act was passed in
1950. Its immediate effect was to restrict transfers of property
between members of different racial groups. Much more
significant was .its longer-term objective. The act. created the
machinery, in the form of the Group Areas Board, for the
demarcating of group areas. The Board would advise the?
government ,,as to which ,areas should be demarcated for the
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exclusive ownership or occupation, or bnlli, of is particular
racial group. Such demarcation could I.lien b<? enforced by
proc: lamation. "•*
The Durban corporatiun's enthusiasm for the group areas
model is borne out by the report of the C.i. ty Council's technical
si.ib~coinmitt.ee, appointed .in November 1750 to consider the racial
zoning of Durban. The report came out firmly in support of the
principle of racial residential segregation, the necessity for
this arising "primarily from the desire of persons of the same
group to live in the same neighbourhood"."0 Esut it was not just
a case of keeping people of different races apart. In some draft
notes produced by the technical sub-committee a bizarre
justification was presented for separating white properties and
Indian smallholdings. The argument went like tlii?: hoth whites
and Indians kept, dogs and chickens, but while whites confined
their chickens to coops and let their dogs roam free, Indians
chained their dogs and let the chickens free;. The result, was
that white dogs attacked Indian chickens, and relations between
the two communities deteriorated."1
The sub -committee's support for segregation did not, of
course, arise out of a concern to protect. Indian-owned chickens.
The sub-committee had a clear idea of how the demarcation of
group areas could facilitate the social and political control of
the black underclasses in Durban, without endanu.eri.rig the labour
supply. It realised, for instance, that it would lie simpler for
the police and military apparatus to deal with large, racially
homogeneous areas than with a racial patchwork. It urged thai-
segregation he as complete and effective as possible. Zone-;,
should be so demarcated that: members of one racial group should
not have to travel through the? zone of another nroup. nnd racial
zones should be separated by effective boundaries. Natural
features, such as rivers, valleys or hills, formed ideal
barriers, in the sub—committee's view, while belts of industrial
or commercial development served as the most effective artificial
barriers. Such belts also formed another important, thread in the
segregation pattern. Group areas planners deemed it essential
that residents in segregated areas should have, easy access to
their place of work. Thus the demarcation of racial zones in
Durban would take into account the main centres of employment for
eac:h racia 1 group."*
It it; beyond the scope of this essay to examinf the
details of the eventual group areas demarcation in Durban. The
technical sub—committee first drew up a set of particular
proposals. In their hatiic outline these.1 followed the ?>egrogation
plan put. ftnward by the* .1.943 <si.tb--L.ummittcn1. But. in sonu:? respects
the? proposals of the .1.9SL sub-commit t.E.'t-1 w«rt too f ar -r eachiipj
evpn for the Durban city council. The sub- coinm i. ttet.'.1 f (:jooinmttndeu,
for instance, that the main residential area between the Umb.ilo
and IJnigeni Filiverc- be i eiwrvi^d for wli i. tet". This would have
involved the largo-soi le d.i. * place Niifc;.wi t o f thousands of Indians
from BydiiMiham iihiJ • !'3pr A rnj f i.i.'J d . When the rit / council (>ven(.ual ly
• • : &
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considered the sub-committee's proposals it was not prepared to
endorse such a massive displacement. It. accordingly suggested
that those areas of Sydenham and Springfield occupied by Indians
should remain an Indian zone. But the city council largely
accepted the sub—committee's basic proposal for the demarcation
of African zones. These would fall in two main areas, to the
: ith and north of Durban.03 It seems that the Durban
c-urporation had particularly strong feelings about the belt of
land owned or occupied by Africans and Indians to the west,
namely Cato Manor and Chest.ervi 1 le. The objection was that this
belt "cut off" the inland white residential areas like Westville.
In May 1951 a deputation from Durban, including the mayor and
city of.fici.al5, voiced this objection to the Minister of Native
Affairs. The minister was not as sympathetic as the deputation
would have liked, and perhaps expected. He could not permit
immediate whplesale removals from the area; and in the short
term living conditions in Cato Manor would have to be improved.04
This last exchange between the central government and the
Durban corporation further illustrates one of the central themes
of this essay, namely the nature of the relationship and
interaction between the central state and the Durban local state.
Some theorists have contended that the local state is essentially
the arm or extension of the central state. Such a contention is
not borne? out by this case-study. For the first three decades or
so of the twentieth century the Durban local state enjoyed a
considerable degree of autonomy in the way it approached the
management of its black underclasses. From the late 1930s in
particular the central state increasingly began to invade that
autonomous sphere; and the accession to power of the
Nationalists in 19413 was to be followed over the next decades by
a gradual centralisation of power and a corresponding diminution
of local autonomy in the management of the black underclasses.
However, even as local state power was being gradually weakened,
the Durban corporation continued to assert its own interests.
This study of influx control administration has shown that the
Durban corporation and the central state were often out of tune
with each other. In the late 1930s, when the central state was
trying to tighten influx control, the Durban corporation was
calling for it to be relaxed. In the early 1940s, after the
government had suspended the pass laws, Durban officials demanded
tighter controls to restrict the African influx into the city.
The passing of the Group Areas Act might also be seen as
a symptom of the growing centralisation of state power at the
expense of municipal autonomy. In some respects this was so, and
in the case of Cape Town very much BO. But in the case of Durban
it would be entirely wrong to conclude that the group areas model
was imposed upon an unwilling and uncooperative local authority.
Officialdom in Durban had shown its enthusiasm for urban racial
segregation long before the Group Areas Act. In the early 1930s
a local segregationist drive gained some momentum. And in the
1940s segregation was still «r?ry much on the agenda of municipal
.1.7
policy-makers. So for Durban, the Group Areas Act did nut
represent any major new departures at the policy level. 1tu main
impact was to spur the corporation into devising, and imp lt.Mnr.Mi t.i ntj
a thorough system of residential st:'cj» eg a t.i. cm. It was the kind.of
system that Durban officials had been favouring over the years
but had lacked the will or the? resources 1.o implement.
Influx control and segregation represent two key
components in the system of urban management and reproduction
developed in South African cities during the course of tlw
twentieth century. This r'ssay has tried to illuminate the
particular local dynamic that lay behind the evolution of this
system in the city of Durban. The Durban case-study serves to
warn against any simplified.view of the central state/local state
relation. It also tries to warn against any reduc tioni1.; t
analysis of urban apartheid. Certainly economic imperative':;
weighed heavily in the Durban cor poration' s implementation of
influx control and segregation. As we have seen, as the influx
control system became niori? refined so was it supposed i..o be mure
closely geared to the labour needs of Durban. And the evolving
pattern of segregation tried to ensure a suitable allocation of
residential space in relation to centres of employment. However,
neither influx control and segregation can be explained in turms
of economic imperatives alone. Both need to be examined in
relation to the collective mentality of Durban's predominantly
white middle class. In the eyes of the majority of Durban's
white residents the African presence in the city has for decades
been (and continues to be) closely associated with problems of
crime, disease and disorder. Thus a major aim of influx control
has been to limit the intrusion of these problems into the city
by excluding those Africans who were surplus to labour
requirements. Similarly, a significant purpose of urban
segregation has been to insulate and immunise middle—class
residential areas against these perceived dangers. Ultimately it
has been a matter of ensuring the t?xploitabi1ity of labour-power,
while maximising the invisibility of the labourers.
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